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Multinational firms and the extractive sectors in the 21st 
century: can they drive development? 
 
Introduction 
It is a central characteristic of a developing country that natural resource sectors dominate its 
economic structure, and it is the gradual shift away from these activities (towards 
manufacturing and services) that is considered to be the hallmark of economic development.  
Indeed, subsistence societies rely almost entirely upon on unmodified ‘natural’ inputs 
associated with land (including subsoil resources, vegetation and animals) and unskilled 
human labour. Development implies an increasing utilization of capital, which I will use in in 
the sense preferred by Adam Smith, as physical assets, machines and people, and not (only) 
in the narrow sense of capital as money
1. In today’s parlance, this is what is known as 
knowledge capital, and refers to the capacity to add value to naturally occurring inputs. 
Natural assets are enhanced by transforming these natural assets into ‘created assets’ 
(Dunning 1993) through the adding of value, either through organisational skills, or 
transforming them through production or processing. Economic development springs from 
reinforcing the efficacy of these transformations within the economy.  The proof of a 
successful development strategy is often taken to be a natural resource sector that is no longer 
the primary sector. In this paper I emphasise the extractive sector, although the principles I 
look to are broadly applicable across all branches of the primary sector, except that extractive 
activities are resources that are non-renewable, and are therefore in fixed supply. They have 
the capacity to provide returns well in excess of their cost of production (referred to as 
‘rents’). Rents from extractive sectors have the potential to create the basis for further 
economic activity in other (renewable) industries, therefore acting as driver for sustainable 
development. I use the term ‘sustainable development’ in a narrower sense than the currently-
popular (but unachievable) ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ to mean economic development 
that does not excessively depend upon natural resources or on volatile commodity prices, and 
is therefore not interrupted by the vagaries of commodities markets. Note that sustainability 
and sustainable development are different concepts: the former term being popularly used 
more narrowly describe the use of natural resources without depletion in order to maintain an 
ecological balance. 
                                                 
1
 Money is, arguably, a natural asset. Its possession per se provides no rents, it is through its astute use (buying a 
property or machinery, investing in stocks, that generates rents, but this requires knowledge.  
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At the heart of the vitality (or its lack) of the extractive sector as an engine for sustainable 
development is the MNE. The MNE (or ‘foreign capital’ as it was referred to in the earlier 
development literature
2
) and the resource sector have a strange and convoluted history. The 
MNE has been much derided in the dependency theory literature as generating too few 
benefits for the host, and causing structural distortions in the local economy, as well 
negatively impacting its political processes (Moran 1978).  MNEs had a habit of internalising 
the complete value chain and creating enclaves around their facilities that had few linkages or 
spillovers locally (see Prebisch 1950, Girvan 1970, 1973). This buttressed the view that the 
MNE in the extractive sector was an obstacle to development.  
As a response, many countries adopted an import substituting, inward-looking policy 
orientation. Where implemented diligently, this led to the growth in some countries of a 
variety of domestic firms that had the competences to extract resources without MNE 
intervention, a cohort of suppliers, and a variety of industries further upstream that utilised 
these extractive outputs. Brazil and India are good examples of countries which have 
succeeded in this regard, developing pockets of excellence in several sectors. This has led to 
a new breed of MNEs (often the progeny of import-substitution) competing with traditional 
MNEs. In Brazil, for example, a successful industrial network developed around Petrobras 
(Dantas and Bell 2011), as well as in the mining sector around Vale (see Rodrigues and 
Dieleman, this issue). In the majority of developing countries, however, domestic sectors 
failed to reach critical mass.  
Since the 1990s, a concatenated change in the organisation of economic activity due to 
globalisation has also seen a change in the organisation of extractive sector activity, and the 
attitude of host countries. Economic liberalisation and a new outward policy orientation has 
pushed states towards greater engagement, reducing MNE-government conflict (Narula and 
Dunning 2000, Mullner and Puck, this issue). At the firm level, extractive sector MNEs no 
longer seek to internalise all value-adding, which in principle has meant more opportunities 
for linkages with the domestic sector. There is also greater awareness in host countries of the 
opportunities the extractive sector can provide, and concurrently greater pressures for 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) from civil society, regulatory agencies and other 
stakeholders, in both developed and developing countries.  
                                                 
2
 The term has its roots in the work of Karl Marx, but is best developed by Rosa Luxemburg (2003). See Rasiah 
(1995) for a useful discussion.  
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In principle, this new dispensation is supposed to increase the potential benefits through 
linkages with host country firms, as well as through competition and demonstration effects.  
But how much do developing countries really benefit (in development terms) from these new 
realities? I argue that much depends upon the strength of the domestic firm sector, and the 
capacity of local actors with whom to link. This is an extension of the vicious cycle of 
poverty: Domestic incapacity is a function of the weakness in the stock of location 
advantages. The more underdeveloped a country is, the weaker the location (L) advantages, 
and this normally implies a weak domestic firm sector (Dunning and Narula 1996, Criscuolo 
and Narula 2008). FDI-led development requires a certain minimum threshold of L 
advantages to ensure that domestic firms are able to survive and thrive.  Ironically, when 
there is poor domestic firm capacity, MNEs are obliged to internalise activities that they 
would have preferred to outsource. Beyond that, sustainable development also requires 
diversification beyond the immediate extractive sector MNE’s value chain. A nascent 
domestic sector (both firms and the associated L advantages) outside the extractive sector in 
required. Without this, the likely outcome is again the overspecialisation that marked the pre-
globalisation era.  
 
Development and the extractive sector: the background 
The limitations of natural resources as a driver of development, and the consequent attention 
paid to upgrading the secondary and tertiary sectors has its roots in the work of Schumpeter, 
and more formally Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950) and Lewis (1954). To simplify a complex 
set of arguments, natural resource outputs are commodities whose prices are volatile, which 
means growth also becomes cyclical. An economy that diversifies away from the primary 
sector into the relatively more stable manufacturing and services sector acts as a ‘valve’ for 
surplus labour and ensures more stable incomes. Coercing a single-sector economy towards a 
more balanced one, forms the dogma upon which much of development strategy rests.  
Resource wealth has not always proven to be a blessing. Auty (1993) introduced the term 
‘resource curse’ to describe countries that underperform despite being resource-rich. Work by 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) found that natural resource dependence had a significant 
negative effect on GDP per capita growth (controlling for initial income, investments in 
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physical and human capital, trade openness, and rule of law)
3
. Failure to diversify away from 
extractive sectors, for example, by utilizing the rents for current consumption is equivalent to 
the liquidation of a country's capital stock (World Bank 2011). The majority of the less 
developed countries have failed to benefit from resource rents
4
 (Venables 2016). Many of 
these countries show growth which is closely mirrors volatile commodity prices, and 
therefore, by its very definition, is unsustainable. Table 1 provides some data on a selection 
of resource-rich countries. These data indicate that in many cases they matter more than they 
did 25 years previously
5
. Table 1 also illustrates the volatility, with high rents in many 
extractive industries attributable to the commodity boom that peaked about 2010.  
***Table 1 about here*** 
Resource abundance is also associated with the ‘Dutch Disease’, which describes the 
propensity for resource-rich countries to over-specialise in resource extraction while 
neglecting tradable activities from other sectors of the economy. Investments in location-
specific assets (human capital, infrastructure) are diverted away from other value-adding 
activities to support the resource sector. Harding and Venables (2016) find that every $1 of 
resource exports decreases non-resource exports by 74 cents, while also increasing imports 
by 23 cents. They also find that domestic manufacturing tends to be crowded-out by resource 
activity to a higher degree than agriculture or services. Given the time-constrained nature of 
subsoil assets, the shrinkage of the rest of the economy can have dire consequences for 
sustained development.  
Our current understanding of the development benefits associated with economic activity is 
greatly shaped by the pioneering work on linkages by Hirschman (1958, 1977, 1981). This 
body of work looks at the opportunities that derive to the larger economy from the activity of 
a given economic actor. This can take the form of direct and indirect engagement 
immediately outside the operations of the focal unit. Hirschman proposed three types of 
linkages. The most basic (and least useful) set of linkages are fiscal linkages. Fiscal linkages 
are rents which the country accrues in the form of taxes, royalties, revenues, and local taxes 
on the incomes of employees. The second type are consumption linkages which derive from 
                                                 
3
 More recent work has determined that the nature of the resource curse is much more nuanced. See Shapiro et 
al, this issue) 
4
 Failure to benefit from resource abundance is not a fait accompli. Malaysia, Botswana and Chile are among the 
few developing countries that have avoided the resource curse.  
5
It is as much a result of the collapse of the unsustainable manufacturing sectors, as about the improved 
competitiveness of the resource sector.  
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demand by the focal firm for the output of other actors in the same country, and these can be 
in the form of services provision and indirect demand for local goods and services. The third 
type are production linkages, which can be forward linkages (other actors adding value to the 
commodity by processing it) and backward (producing inputs to be utilised in the extraction 
of the commodity). Production linkages can exist within the extractive sector along the same 
value chain (intra-industry), but they can also be inter-industry (horizontal) (Kaplinsky et al 
2011). For sustainable development inter-industry linkages are essential. The generation of 
new industries – whether these are support industries (such as banks, or transportation and 
logistics companies) which have multiple potential users across sectors, or horizontal effects 
that initiate new value chains in other, non-extractive sectors (Kaplinsky et al 2011).  
There is a fairly recent literature that indicates that the Dutch disease and lower rates of 
growth are not inevitable outcomes of having a strong comparative advantage in the 
extractive sector. Ville and Wicken (2012) point to the case of Norway and Australia as 
having managed sustained growth over a long period. Similar observations can be made for 
the US and many European nations at earlier epochs in the history (Wright 1990).  This view 
suggests that it is possible to create a dynamic set of industries and activities around a 
resource-rich country’s ‘core’ asset. These sets of related and interlinked industries involve 
higher value added activities, where price changes are offset by productivity improvements, 
through technological innovation, organisational changes and increased efficiencies in 
collaboration with complementary actors. Indeed, the evidence is convincing that it is not the 
presence of natural resources per se that leads to low growth rates, but the failure to utilise 
the rents to develop a location-specific set of complementary assets that support upgrading. 
 
‘Foreign capital’ and development – a chronological perspective 
The absence of growth from extractive sectors in the Prebisch-Singer perspective derived in 
part from the dominating role of foreign capital in extraction (nowadays refer to as FDI).  The 
logic of this argument went as follows. Resource extraction is a highly capital-intensive 
exercise. Considerable ownership (O) advantages are needed to engage in extractive 
industries, and since the sector has a high scale- and capital–intensity, it is naturally 
oligopolistic, dominated as it is (was) by a handful for MNEs (Shapiro et al, this issue).  
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Being a large actor is de rigueur, and as such these actors are either state-controlled (and/or 
formerly state-owned) or private MNEs with the particular financial, technological and 
human capital which provides them with distinct (and hard-to-copy) O advantages. The O 
advantages of these MNEs are fourfold, and have not changed over the last century or so:  
1. They have the technological capability to access resources in locations that were 
previously extremely difficult to access, and/or to explore and extract more value 
from subsoil assets that weaker counterparts would have abandoned (Kraemer and 
van Tulder 2009). These technological assets are more about process technologies, 
and are a key source of competitiveness.  
2. They possess an intricate knowledge of specialised markets and are able to organise 
themselves across borders within and between hierarchies as a result of superior 
abilities in coordinating a multitude of value chains in several locations.  
3. They have deep pockets and access to financial capital by leveraging global capital 
markets (or the treasury of their home country), which permits them to negotiate long-
term control of significant natural resources. Long-term concessions are necessary to 
recover the high sunk costs of extraction. 
4. They have strong political connections both at home and in the host country. 
Large extractive MNEs had (and continue to have) the capacity to dominate their host 
economy (especially the smaller, less developed countries with a single-sector focus (Girvan 
1970). A typical extractive MNE may have global revenues that are equivalent to the GDP of 
many a host economy. They therefore have a natural capacity for regulatory capture, and this 
allowed for uneven distribution of rents that favoured the MNE (The same was often true for 
these MNEs in their home country).  
These MNEs were vertically integrated and coordinated markets through quasi-hierarchies 
across borders, thereby influencing prices. Given these characteristics, this led to an 
asymmetric relationship between host (or home) and the MNE. MNEs in the extractive sector 
(mostly headquartered in the developed countries) had (and still have) the capacity to 
internalise imperfect markets on a global basis.   
The principles of MNE-assisted development in the extractive sectors are no different from 
other sectors (UNCTAD 2007). There is need for a certain threshold level of L advantages to 
attract MNEs in the first instance; however the benefits from the FDI come from the degree 
to which they are embedded, and create direct and indirect effects in the local economy. In 
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other words, benefits derive largely from the capacity of other collocated firms (domestic and 
foreign-owned) to establish (and deepen) linkages (Giroud 2012, Jindra et al 2009).  When 
extractive operations are linked shallowly with other actors in the host economy, there are 
few obvious development effects beyond fiscal and consumption linkages. Linkages do not 
always happen spontaneously, they need to be developed, nurtured and promoted, and 
encouraged to expand both backwards and forward.  
The creation of infrastructure that is multi-user and available to all at marginal cost is an 
important precondition for consumption and production linkages. Where infrastructure is 
highly specific to a specific user or sector, it limits the benefits to other sectors of the 
economy (and increases the enclave effect). Likewise, forward linkages also require 
complementary investments in L advantages, and a vibrant domestic firm sector. The 
viability of this approach depends on the wider capabilities and comparative advantage of the 
local economy. 
 
MNEs and the extractive sector: a drama in three parts 
The history of MNE engagement in the extractive sector can be seen as having three phases. 
Act I: the extractive MNE and rent extraction until the 1950s/60s 
The first proto-MNEs began as state-sanctioned chartered companies (e.g., the British, Dutch 
and French East India companies) that de facto or de jure controlled the former European 
colonies in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Jones 2005). Their reputation for extracting 
maximum rents at the expense of the host country through ethically and morally dubious 
means defined the image of the MNE (and therefore the attitude) of many former colonies 
towards large MNEs (privately or publicly owned). Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that 
the over-specialisation of many developing countries reflects the priorities from colonial 
period. Investments in the colonies were designed to extract resources for immediate export 
and subsequent processing and sale at home at the lowest possible cost (and possible re-
export back to the colonies after processing). This often came at high social costs, which 
ignored traditional property rights and land usage, the forcible resettlement of indigenes, and 
the destruction of habitats 
6
(Girvan 1970, 1973, Barclay 2015).  
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 For an extreme perspective, see Rodney (1972) 
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That benefits did not accrue from resource-intensive sectors along with a related attenuation 
of other ‘traditional’ economic activities (for instance, artisanal mining, cottage industries, 
agriculture) shaped the over-specialisation and accentuated the ‘dual economy’ nature of 
many developing countries, the duality being noted primarily for the disconnect between the 
two aspects (see for instance Yakovleva & Vasquez, this issue). Duality was (and remains) a 
defining feature of less developed countries
7
. Development opportunities were (and are) 
constrained when both parts of the duality have an enclave character. The linkages between 
the two were intentionally weak in the colonial era, and in many cases have remained weakly 
linked (Levitt and Best 1975).   
MNEs contributed to this enclave nature. Extractive sectors were often (but not always) 
associated with rural, geographically isolated locations. This often means (although it should 
not) a poorly developed infrastructure prior to the establishment of industrial-scale extraction. 
Basic infrastructure (roads, railways, electricity, potable water) are generally in poor 
condition or non-existent, and there is a dearth of skilled and semi-skilled workers (because 
such places rarely have schools).  MNEs may build roads, schools, clinics, and essentially set 
up private infrastructure for their own use. The extent to which these are made available to 
the immediate local community is limited (Shapiro et al this issue). This creates a de facto 
physically isolated enclave with a high quality infrastructure. Communities outside the 
‘catchment area’ received limited access to these resources. MNEs tended to utilise a high 
ratio of expatriates to local employees in technical and management jobs. 
Indeed, Singer (1950) asserted that the commodities sector was intentionally designed by the 
MNE to have an enclave character, planned to facilitate the export of commodities and the 
reduction of the associated transportation costs. The opportunities for the further processing 
domestically, either for domestic use or for higher value added export, was rarely a 
consideration (Morris et al 2012).  These characteristics were very much evident during much 
of the early 20
th
 century with large MNEs who internalised the rents from extraction through 
transfer pricing, and by performing much of the processing in their home countries. This 
negative image of the MNE was not enhanced by their abuse of their economic strength to 
affect the outcome of domestic politics to their own advantage.  
Act II: Import-substitution era and the extractive MNE 
                                                 
7
 Formally developed by Lewis (1954).  The nature of the duality having evolved over the years, the key 
principle being a strong resource-intensive sector and a less-developed knowledge-intensive one (Narula 2015).  
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These circumstances – excessive rent extraction by MNEs, state capture, persistent 
underdevelopment – led to import-substitution policies in many developing countries by the 
1950s. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex set of developments
8
, the doctrine of import 
substitution took hold in the post-World War II era, emphasised moving away from exporting 
primary commodities and importing manufactures, towards developing a domestic industrial 
base. Protection was undertaken through tariffs, exchange rate manipulation, quotas and 
exchange controls.  They emphasised a reduced dependence on primary activities, as well as 
a concurrent wave of nationalisation of the assets of MNEs along with an emphasis on 
building up (new) domestically owned actors. Control of subsoil assets were transferred to 
these national champions (mainly state-owned), with a mandate to maximise local content, 
and to provide inputs for the nascent manufacturing sectors.  
Import-substitution (IS) policies did lead to economic growth in most developing countries 
during the 1960s and the 1970s, although the anticipated expansion of domestic 
manufacturing did was by no means uniformly successful. IS schemes were not adjusted to 
reflect differences in comparative advantages, but sought to duplicate the same breadth of 
industrial sectors regardless of their initial specialisation and resource endowment.  
There are two key outcomes from the IS-era (for our purposes). First, the nationalisation 
and/or emphasis on creating domestic actors and maximising local content created a new set 
of domestic actors in the extractive sector. Infant industry protection coupled with capital and 
technology from abroad (sometimes through joint ventures with traditional MNEs, in other 
cases through turn-key projects and the provision of technical experts) created a new set of 
actors. The largest domestic firms from India, Russia, China, Malaysia, and Brazil today are 
extractive firms that come from the IS era.  
Second, a number of developing countries made concurrent investments in their location 
advantages, particularly in infrastructure and education. Indeed, many developing countries 
had built up a certain degree of absorptive capacity, and a small but impressive set of world-
class universities, research institutes and support industries.  Development requires as a sine 
qua non a variety of key L advantages. The L advantages needed to benefit from natural 
resources are no different from those needed to attract inward FDI by MNEs, as well as build 
a viable domestic firm sector (Lall 1992, Criscuolo and Narula 2008, Narula and Dunning 
                                                 
8
 See Bruton (1998) for an excellent overview, and which forms the basis of the discussion on import 
substitution here. 
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2010), and many of today’s successful emerging economies were able to achieve this. These 
include a certain minimum level of infrastructure (including skilled and semiskilled human 
capital), functional markets (or organisations that can overcome market failures) to provide 
financial capital and other crucial support activities, stable institutions in the form of 
functional government agencies to ensure that these public goods are available to all 
economic actors fairly. 
Not all countries invested in upgrading L advantages, or established the stable institutions 
necessary. In their absence, rents from natural resources were used for current consumption 
and wastefully dissipated. Weak governments also utilised resource rents to buy legitimacy. 
The existence or emergence of large resource rents can aggravate the feebleness of formal 
institutions, and this in turn means that resource rents are not deployed for development, but 
to extend the rule of autocratic and corrupt governments (Collier and O’Connell 2006). 
 
Act III: Extractive MNEs in the age of globalisation and liberalisation  
The end of the 20
th
 century saw the reversal of the import-substitution programmes, and 
replaced with a more export-oriented, outward-looking policy orientation that also 
rehabilitated the MNE. These policy changes saw a dramatic shift away from promoting 
manufacturing towards a comparative advantage-based approach. Intervention by host 
countries became less confrontational and more cooperative, as FDI has become part of the 
economic development plans of many countries. The need to negotiate and create incentives 
for MNEs was now a key aspect of policy. This led to a consequent shift in economic 
structure towards the primary sector, a growth in commodities exports, and shrinkage of 
secondary activities (Rodrik 2016). Much of the work on MNEs and economic development 
(see Narula and Dunning 2010 for a review, in addition to UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Reports) has emphasised the role of spillovers and linkages from MNEs as the key to 
development.  
Dramatic changes associated with globalisation have also seen important changes in the way 
in which MNEs organise their activities. There is a greater move away from full 
internalisation by firms (not just MNEs) towards non-equity and quasi-hierarchical 
governance of value chains that involve a network of actors. These developments have 
increased the potential for greater participation for host country actors than was previously 
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the case. There are also new actors, in the form of large state-owned (or state-controlled) 
firms, and private MNEs from developing countries with the capital and resources to compete 
with the ‘traditional’ developed country MNEs. These firms are often the outcome of IS-era 
policies. Not all countries were able to build strong domestic actors. The nationalisation wave 
that typified developing countries during the IS-era did not always provide the social and 
economic benefits expected, especially in less developed nations (Barclay 2015). Weak state-
owned actors were privatized, in some cases engaging with MNEs through joint ventures, in 
other cases sold in their entirety to MNEs.  
There are today fewer monolithic MNEs that own all aspects (or even most) of the value 
chain and maintain their own infrastructure.  The trend towards the use of non-equity modes 
has spread to the mining sector as well (Molina et al 2016). Although the extent to which the 
extractive sector has gone towards GVC-like structures varies considerably by firm, sub-
sector and host country, there is a greater tendency to rely on specialised firms rather than 
their wholly-owned affiliates.   
However, it would be wrong to assume that this led to a decreased influence of the MNE. 
Reduced ownership has not reduced their control. MNEs continue to exert considerable 
control as ‘flagship’ or ‘lead’ firms, but like lead firms in other GVC-friendly sectors, they 
are inclined to exert this control through non-equity mechanisms, either through outsourcing 
or through collaborative agreements (UNCTAD 2014, Narula and Wahed 2017, Kaplinsky et 
al 2011, Puck and Mullner, this issue).  
A variety of enabling technologies have further assisted in enhancing the scope for the 
fragmentation of mining value chains. Activities that are easily codified such as logistics and 
transportation, warehousing, and so forth can now be outsourced. Specialised skills and 
heavy equipment (and their maintenance and operation) necessary can be leased from (or 
sub-contracted to) a variety of specialised actors. Where previously MNEs might have had to 
directly invest in designing and developing equipment, building infrastructure, and recruiting 
the necessary skilled specialists, these tasks can now be outsourced to specialised firms 
(Molina et al 2016).  The extractive sector still has an oligopsonistic structure and the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour by external partners is minimal.  However, the high capital intensity 
keeps the number of suppliers limited. 
In terms of MNE-host country relations, there have been changes on both sides. Extractive 
MNEs have become conscious of their reputation for regulatory capture, and – perhaps 
13 
 
because of the negative press from well-publicised (and disastrous) cases of extreme 
regulatory capture through regime change in Latin America and Africa– MNEs have sought 
to act with more consideration. Rent-sharing and contractual obligations negotiated between 
MNEs and nation states are more carefully observed, not only by the actors themselves but 
also by NGOs, supra-national institutions and stakeholders in the home country (Puck and 
Mullner, this issue).  
Likewise, host countries are more aware of the need for monitoring the environmental and 
societal effects of extractive firms, and have at their disposal the expertise of a wide variety 
of expert advice. They are more uniformly engaged in ensuring that rents are accrued locally, 
by greater care in including (and monitoring) local content, taxes, repatriated profits.  
Home countries less explicitly pursue the interests of their MNEs, with the possible exception 
of China. To the contrary, home country civil societies in developed countries can positively 
affect the environmental and social outcomes in their MNE overseas activity. MNEs are 
expected by pressure groups at home to constrain their activities to similar standards abroad, 
even where the host country does not require it (Zyglidopoulos et al this issue). Again, 
differences exist due to home country nationality – Canadian and European MNEs are more 
sensitive to home country social activism, while newer MNEs from developing countries 
(India, China, Russia) are less so. Engaging in CSR and entering local partnerships allow 
MNEs to enhance their organizational legitimacy in the host location, and as an important 
signal of their CSR credentials for other prospective host locations, as well as promoting 
good relations with civil society at home (for an interesting related discussion, see Buchanan 
and Marques, this issue). 
A number of new large extractive industry MNEs from developing countries have strong 
home government ties, and in consequence are often still regarded as national champions. 
However, what is relevant to the present paper is that these new MNEs (both state-owned and 
formerly state-owned) have sought to internationalise, oftentimes relying on their de facto 
status as national champions. This permits them access to subsidised capital.  Coupled with 
large subsoil reserves at home, these act as a substantial source of FSAs in their overseas 
expansion (Barclay 2015, Narula 2012).  
 
Has the new dispensation improved the potential for sustainable development? 
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The changes due to globalisation and liberalisation have increased the potential for linkages, 
both in terms of quantity and quality (Santangelo 2009). While the increased use of wider 
(and somewhat looser) types of governance has increased the potential for outsourcing and 
collaborative activities, depending upon the commodity and the institutional conditions of the 
host country. Large mining contractors like Theiss are able to take on all aspects of mining 
operations, or a single fragment. Others specialise in smaller, specialised segments, such as 
site construction or operating and maintaining equipment.  In general, suppliers are firms 
with whom the flagship firm has a long extent relationship (Hanlin and Hanlin 2012). The 
extractive sector MNEs are much more capital-intensive, and high sunk costs of acquiring 
mineral rights must be written off gradually over decades and not years. While there are 
windfall rents on occasion, the boom-and-bust cycle means that over a 30 year period, returns 
over the lifetime of a mine may be small. It behoves them to work with partners whose 
organisations are closely aligned organisationally and culturally, and with whom there is a 
minimal risk of shirking (Hanlin and Hanlin 2012, Molina et al 2016). The high capital 
intensity and large scale needed to be a supplier are hard to achieve for most developing 
country firms (Farooki 2012, Kaplan 2012). Besides, MNEs now seek to develop global 
contracts, such that a single supplier provides inputs and services across all its operations 
globally.  
Nonetheless, lead firms have strong incentives to identify new domestic suppliers (Adewuyi 
and Oyejide 2012). Many MNEs have dedicated supplier development programmes, either as 
part of their negotiated local content clauses, or their own CSR outreach efforts. Where inputs 
are highly codifiable, less strategic and do not require close coordination, lead firms may 
intentionally seek multiple and redundant alternative suppliers. Extractive activities also 
require location-specific knowledge, and need specialised equipment for specialised 
conditions.  
By and large, opportunities for supplier firms from less developed countries are limited to 
support activities that do not require FSAs that derive from global presence and high capital 
intensity. These include accounting, health and safety, public and community relations, 
human resources management, marketing, quality control, and civil maintenance. Such 
activities require local knowledge and contacts, and generate consumption linkages 
(Fessehaie 2012, Teka 2012).   
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There is space for domestic firms who can adapt or create efficiencies for a particular 
operation (Kaplan 2012, Molina et al 2016), and thereby generate production linkages.  With 
some notable exceptions from Brazil, Peru, Chile, South Africa, China, Russia and India, 
there are few developing countries that have domestic firms capable of being original 
equipment manufacturers. This requires the capacity to engage in innovation through active 
R&D, and this in turn requires a fairly robust innovation system to support this. Building up 
strong sectoral innovation systems requires a threshold level of tertiary educational 
establishments, research institutes, and functional institutions to link up with domestic and 
foreign economic actors.  State programmes that link research institutes and financing with 
firms that have the opportunity and potential to upgrade their O advantages have been tried 
with a fair degree of success in the countries mentioned (Morris et al 2012, Figueiredo and 
Piana 2016, Kaplan 2012).  
The post-IS era has – by and large – seen a decline in the quality of knowledge infrastructure 
and public goods in many developing countries, and a consequent decline in their L 
advantages. Adewuyi and Oyejide (2012) note that Nigeria’s oil and gas sector has been 
fairly successful in building up domestic actors to participate with lead MNEs, due in part to 
Nigeria’s investments in infrastructure and education during the 1960s and 1970s, and 
assisted by the import substitution programme that prevailed until the mid-1980s (Biersteker 
2014). In the longer run, opportunities are likely to remain restricted to fiscal linkages and 
commodity linkages in the absence of a sturdy science and technology infrastructure.   
Conclusions: Looking to the future 
Although there are clearly greater opportunities for sustainable development through the 
astute use of linkages and rents, this is not an easy path to follow. High rents during a 
commodity boom are often easily disbursed on a variety of political and economic priorities. 
The most recent commodity boom driven by Chinese demand for resources since the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century has also been followed by a downturn since about 2013. Despite 
fairly good governance, infrastructure and institutions, much of Latin America has failed to 
invest in building up either their national absorptive capacity, or the competitiveness of their 
home-grown firms. Weak location advantages - especially those associated with the 
knowledge infrastructure – are victims of systematic neglect and underinvestment in much of 
sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, creating an uneven quality of human capital. The 
retreat of the vertically integrated MNE that dominated the sector during much of the 20
th
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century has not necessarily led to greater local embeddedness and production linkages. Both 
lead MNEs and major mining contractors are keen to increase local content and local 
suppliers, and to help existing suppliers upgrade. However, finding new suppliers/replacing 
existing suppliers happens only gradually (Pietrobelli and Saliola 2009), and systemic 
weaknesses in the formal firm sector limits substantial local linkage formation (Pietrobelli 
and Staritz 2013). The countries that have the capacity for increased linkages are those that 
were more successful in the import substitution era, building the appropriate infrastructure to 
support the firm sector that came out of this period. Unfortunately, only a small subset of new 
actors has survived the exposure to international competition over the last three decades, and 
there have been few new entrants subsequently.  
New extractive MNEs from emerging economies has altered the market in the extractive 
industries, but it is not evident that they generate greater linkages. Fessehaie (2012) notes the 
considerable differences in the way in which Chinese and Indian MNEs engage with 
suppliers in Zambia. For instance, Chinese MNEs showed a preference for Chinese suppliers 
and demonstrated little interest in embedding themselves locally; the Indian MNE showed 
little supplier loyalty and was overly price conscious. Unlike the South African and North 
American firms, neither the Indians nor Chinese were interested in fostering supplier upgrade 
programmes. Indeed, Chinese MNEs have shown a predilection to develop enclaves, bringing 
in Chinese workers, and Chinese suppliers, even where local suppliers are readily available, 
especially in Africa. This has led to a degree of crowding out, especially in construction and 
infrastructure.   
By and large, upgrading through linkages has been largely limited to fiscal and consumption 
linkages. Developing deeper linkages – whether in the extractive sector or any other – is a 
long term initiative. Linkages requires embedding, which in turn requires stability of policies 
and institutions, and investment in knowledge capital (Giuliani et al 2005, Figueiredo and 
Piana 2016)). Rents are accrued by those who control the knowledge capital, but it requires 
capital to beget capital. Indeed, knowledge capital can be said to be scarcer than financial 
capital, and it must be nurtured.   
As Kaplinsky et al (2011) emphasise, sustainable development requires developing new 
sectors less reliant on exhaustible resources, and the expansion of inter-industry linkages. 
However, in much of the developing world, the extractive sector maintains an enclave-like 
character; Countries that avoided the resource curse carefully nurtured inter-industry 
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linkages, and deliberately sought to avoid over-specialisation. Marin et al (2015) point to the 
recent success of Argentina and Chile in leveraging their natural resources to build up new 
industries that are more ‘future-proof’. However, horizontal linkages require long-term 
sustained and orchestrated policies, and cannot be foisted on the MNE. Inter-industry 
linkages are hard to mandate as part of a local content policy, which are likely only to 
strengthen vertical linkages. Venables (2016) notes that policies on their own have ‘generally 
not led to transformative growth of new activities’. Linkage creation needs to be effectively 
managed and promoted, and this requires a long-term view and hands-on engagement with 
both MNEs and domestic actors. 
Implications for theory 
Internationalisation by definition requires non-location-bound O advantages. Firms that do 
not have equivalent O advantages to the market leaders in successfully organising and 
participating in complex cross-border hierarchies and networks are rarely able to survive in 
the long run.  Managing large scale MNEs requires other higher-order O advantages, such as 
the ability to achieve economies of common governance. Such O advantages are hard to 
acquire through M&A, as the knowledge is firm-specific and difficult to codify and transfer. 
Much has been commented upon about the rise of MNEs from emerging economies. Several 
of these EMNEs, particularly those from Brazil, China, Russia, South Africa and India have 
expanded rapidly internationally through M&A. While these firms may have the 
technological and financial assets to expand abroad, it is not always obvious whether they are 
able to capture economies from common governance. In addition, their lack of experience in 
foreign markets means that they are likely to replicate practices that are effective at home, but 
less effective elsewhere.  
Beyond the ‘traditional’ O advantages discussed in this paper, a new and important higher 
order O advantage that is increasingly critical in this sector is the capacity to be socially and 
environmentally responsible. This goes beyond CSR practices. Zyglidopoulos et al (this 
issue) point to the need to have a ‘social license to operate’ from local communities, in 
addition to legal rights from the state. Acquiring such a ‘social license’ is a matter of 
experience, and by its very nature is a location-specific advantage. It is worthy of note that 
MNEs with considerable success at home in Canada (for instance) at engaging with local 
communities and being socially and environmentally responsible, are unable to translate such 
success abroad. This reflects the location-boundedness of such knowledge. Not all MNEs are 
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able to translate knowledge from one location to another, because all knowledge to some 
extent is sticky and context-specific. The idiosyncratic nature of every project means that 
being good at engaging with local communities (and their expectations) in one location does 
not necessarily help in a new location or country. In other words, there are no scale 
economies in CSR.   
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Table 1  Resource dependence, selected countries 
  
1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 
Sorted by GDP  
NR 
exports/tota
l exports 
(%) 
NR rents 
as % of 
GDP 
NR 
exports/to
tal exports 
NR rents 
as % of 
GDP 
NR 
exports/tot
al exports 
(%) 
NR rents 
as % of 
GDP 
NR 
exports/tot
al exports 
(%) 
NR rents 
as % of 
GDP 
NR 
exports/tot
al exports 
NR rents 
as % of 
GDP 
Brazil 9 2.7 10 2.2 8% 2.5 26% 4.5 19% 2,9 
Canada 10 9.0 10 3.1 11% 4.5 22% 2,8 19% 0,9 
Australia 15 6.2 25 3,3 21% 2.6 50% 9.6 45% 4,8 
Nigeria 83 34.6 93 50,4 94% 38.2 85% 13.8 87% 4,7 
Norway 47 7.6 41 7,9 58% 11.5 56% 7.7 51% 5,4 
South Africa 22 15.1 15 6,0 17% 2.9 24% 7.7 20% 4,2 
Malaysia 25 37.1 18 25,7 7% 9.8 11% 8.4 9% 4,8 
Colombia 0.5 4,5 29 7.3 35% 5.1 48% 6.3 52% 3,6 
Chile 15 9,1 11 11.6 16% 6,9 24% 18,2 26% 12,2 
Source: CHELEM and The World Bank, various databases 
Note: Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard 
and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. The estimates of natural resources rents are 
calculated as the difference between the price of a commodity and the average cost of 
producing it. 
 
